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We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, sym-
metric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in
the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for
uncountably in…nite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a long-
standing claim to the same e¤ect, due to McKelvey (1986), in the political
science literature. Further, we prove the non-emptiness of the uncovered set
under quite general assumptions, and we establish, under various assump-
tions, the measurability and coanalyticity of this set. In the concluding sec-
tion, we indicate how the inclusion result may be extended to multi-player,
non-zero-sum games.1 Introduction
A common conclusion drawn from work on the multi-dimensional spatial
model of elections is that, typically, anything can happen (Riker (1980)).
One strand of work has established that the core, consisting of alternatives
unbeaten in pairwise majority comparisons, is generically empty;1 another,
assuming the core is empty, has deduced the existence of a global cycle.2
The situation facing two o¢ce-motivated parties might appear, therefore,
to be quite indeterminate: from the former strand of work, we know that
pure strategy Nash equilibria of the party competition game rarely exist; and
from the latter strand, every policy alternative is typically rationalizable. In
a seminal paper, McKelvey (1986) claimed to the contrary that the support
of mixed strategy equilibria of the game, if they exist, will lie in a centrally
located region of the policy space called the “uncovered set.” He suggested,
moreover, that the uncovered set will collapse, in a continuous way, to the
core when it is non-empty; Cox (1987) proved this for an odd number of
voters, and Banks, Duggan, and Le Breton (1998) extend the result to a
continuum of voters. Thus, the analysis of the uncovered set tells us that
equilibrium outcomes will be “close” to the core when the core is “close” to
non-empty.
The uncovered set was de…ned originally by Fishburn (1979) and Miller
(1980) and axiomatized by Moulin (1986) in the context of tournaments, i.e.,
binary relations representing majority preferences of a society over a …nite
set of policy alternatives. Fisher and Ryan (1991) and La¤ond, Laslier, and
Le Breton (1993) independently proved that, in the absence of majority-ties,
the party competition game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and
that the support of the agents’ strategies lies in the uncovered set. Recently,
Dutta and Laslier (1998) have de…ned the uncovered set in the context of
general …nite, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games, and they have shown
that the support of each mixed strategy equilibrium (no longer unique) still
lies in the uncovered set.3
McKelvey’s (1986) analysis of the spatial model was the …rst to con-
sider the uncovered set in an in…nite setting, where policy alternatives are
1Plott (1967), Rubinstein (1979), Scho…eld (1983), Cox (1984), Le Breton (1987), McK-
elvey and Scho…eld (1987), Banks (1995), Saari (1997).
2McKelvey (1976, 1979), Cohen (1979), Austen-Smith and Banks (1997).
3In fact, more is proved: La¤ond, Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) show that the support
of the mixed strategy equilibrium lies in the minimal covering set, a smaller set introduced
by Dutta (1988) in the context of tournaments; Dutta and Laslier (1998) extend the
minimal covering set to …nite, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games and obtain the
same inclusion.
1modelled as points in a convex subset of Euclidean space, and majority pref-
erences over social policies are determined by the continuous, strictly convex
preferences of a …nite electorate. Payo¤s of the party competition game are,
therefore, highly discontinuous, and the existence of mixed strategy equilib-
ria in this model remains an open question.4 Nonetheless, McKelvey claims
that if a mixed strategy equilibrium does exist, the support of the parties’
mixed strategies will necessarily lie in the uncovered set. His proof contains
a critical error,5 but we con…rm that the claim is, indeed, true.
We frame the problem in the more general context of two-player, sym-
metric, zero-sum games, allowing for in…nite strategy spaces. By way of
introduction, we …rst extend the known inclusion results for the uncovered
set to the case of games with countable strategy sets, obtaining the result
of Dutta and Laslier (1998) as a special case. We then generalize this to
the case of games with continuous payo¤s and possibly uncountable strategy
sets. Because of the discontinuities inherent in the spatial model, however,
this level of generality is not su¢cient to recover McKelvey’s result. We
go on to consider games for which the set of strategy pro…les yielding a
positive payo¤ is open, a weak continuity condition satis…ed in the party
competition game studied in McKelvey (1986) and Banks, Duggan, and Le
Breton (1998). We prove, as claimed by McKelvey, that the uncovered set
includes the support of all mixed strategy equilibria. We also prove that the
uncovered set is non-empty, generalizing another result of McKelvey’s and
a later result of Bordes, Le Breton, and Salles (1992), and we provide an
example showing that the inclusion can fail unless some continuity condition
is imposed.
Once uncountable strategy sets are allowed for, a number of interesting
technical issues arise. Chief among them, it appears that, even when the
payo¤ function of the game is continuous, the uncovered set may be non-
measurable. To address this di¢culty, we employ the theory of analytic sets,
developed by Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), surveyed by Stinchcombe and
White (1992) and, brie‡y, in the appendix of this paper. We show that,
assuming full continuity, the uncovered set is the complement of an analytic
set. Assuming only the weak continuity condition above, it appears that not
even this much can be said.
4Kramer (1978) provides a mixed strategy equilibrium existence result under the as-
sumption of a continuum of voters and vote-maximizing parties.
5McKelvey notes that strategies outside the uncovered set are weakly dominated for the
parties, and he concludes with the claim that equilibrium strategies cannot put positive
probability on “dominated strategies.” While this is true of strictly dominated strategies,
it is clearly not for weakly dominated ones.
22 Preliminaries
Let X be a set of strategies and u:X £X ! < be a payo¤ function de…ning
a two-player, zero-sum game, (X;u), symmetric in the sense that u(x;y) =
¡u(y;x) for all x;y 2 X. Throughout, X is endowed with a topology
(discrete if X is countable) and its Borel ¾-algebra, and u is assumed to be
measurable with respect to the product ¾-algebra on X £ X. The party








where P is an asymmetric relation on X representing majority preferences.
McKelvey (1986) shows, assuming a …nite electorate, that continuity of voter
preferences is su¢cient for P to be open.6 We do so elsewhere (Banks,
Duggan, and Le Breton (1998)) for an arbitrary electorate. The condition
that P is open is, in turn, su¢cient for measurability of u.
Let ¾ denote a typical mixed strategy, i.e., a Borel probability measure
on X, and let ¾ denote the outer measure induced by ¾; that is,
¾(Y ) = inff¾(Z) j Z mble, Y µ Zg
for all subsets Y µ X. When Y is Borel measurable, ¾(Y) = ¾(Y ). The










where ¾ £ ¾ is the product measure induced by the mixed strategies. The






















6In fact, McKelvey considers social preferences derived from general simple games. Our
results apply equally well in this setting.
3It is clear that, if (¾;¾0) is a Nash equilibrium, neither ¾ nor ¾0 can put
positive probability on the set of strictly dominated strategy pro…les. We
pursue a tighter bound on the support of mixed strategy equilibria.
Our analysis employs the following binary relations on X.
xDy (8z 2 X;u(x;z) ¸ u(y;z)) &(9z 2 X;u(x;z) > u(y;z))
xMy (u(x;y) > 0) &(8z 2 X;u(y;z) > 0 ) u(x;z) > 0)
xGy (u(x;y) > 0) &(8z 2 X;u(z;x) > 0 ) u(z;y) > 0)
xCy (u(x;y) > 0) &xDy
Here, D is the usual notion of weak dominance; M is the Miller relation,
introduced by Miller (1980) in the context of majority voting; G is the Gillies
relation, introduced by Gillies (1959) in his analysis of zero-sum games and
proposed by Fishburn (1979) in the context of majority voting; and C is the
covering relation, de…ned by McKelvey (1986) in the context of the spatial
voting model. Note that M and G are generally stronger than C, and that
the relations are equivalent in the majority voting model without ties (i.e.,
x 6= y implies u(x;y) 2 f1;¡1g). Each of the relations de…ned above is a
strict partial order and, if X is …nite, it follows that each possesses maximal
elements. In Section 4, we give general conditions su¢cient for the existence
of G-maximal, and therefore C-maximal, strategies.
The rationalizable strategies of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) give
bounds on the support of mixed strategy equilibria. As the next examples
show, there is no general inclusion relation between this set and the maximal
strategies of the above relations. Payo¤s are given for the row player.
Example 1. Here, xCz but z is rationalizable as a best response to y,
which is a best response to w, which is a best response to z.
[Figure 1 here.]
Example 2. Here, x is C-maximal but strictly dominated for the row player
by the mixed strategy (0;1=2;1=2), and therefore it is not rationalizable.
[Figure 2 here.]
See Duggan and Le Breton (1998) for an example of the majority voting
model in which a C-maximal strategy is not rationalizable. Thus, the con-
clusion of Example 2 carries over to this important special case of games.
4Duggan and Le Breton show, however, that, in the absence of ties, the
C-maximal strategies are always rationalizable.
As in Examples 3 and 4, below, weakly dominated strategies may be
played with positive probability in equilibrium. Moreover, they show that
the sets of M- and G-maximal elements are too small to bound the support
of mixed strategy equilibria, even in the majority voting model.
Example 3. Let X = fx;y;zg with payo¤s below. Note that ((0;1=2;1=2),
(0;1=2;1=2)) is a Nash equilibrium, but xMy.
[Figure 3 here.]
Example 4. Let X = fx;y;z;wgwithpayo¤s below. Note that ((0;1=3;1=3,
1=3);(0;1=3;1=3;1=3)) is a Nash equilibrium, but xGy.
[Figure 4 here.]
Thus, of the relations introduced above, we focus on the maximal ele-
ments of the covering relation for a bound on the support of mixed strategy
equilibria. The uncovered set, denoted U, consists of the maximal elements
of the covering relation: x 2 U if and only if there is no y 2 X such that
yCx. Letting V = X n U denote the set of covered strategies, we can view
C:V !! X as a correspondence, with graphC = f(x;y) 2 X £ X j y 2
C(x)g.
In the appendix, we prove a lemma on the measurable structure of
graphC and its projection, V . Under the most general assumptions, we can
say little; adding continuity of u, graphC is measurable and V is analytic;
adding compactness of X, both sets (and therefore U) are measurable.
3 Continuous Games
The uncovered set has received much attention in the context of tourna-
ments, including an axiomatic characterization by Moulin (1986); La¤ond,
Laslier, and Le Breton (1993) have proved, as a corollary of their result on
the minimal covering set, that the support of the unique mixed strategy equi-
librium is included in the uncovered set; and Dutta and Laslier (1998) have
extended this to …nite, two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games. Our …rst
result, mainly illustrative, veri…es the inclusion for countable, two-player,
symmetric, zero-sum games.
5Theorem 1. If X is countable and (¾;¾0) is a Nash equilibrium then
¾(U) = ¾0(U) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that ¾(U) < 1 and note that, by interchangeability, (¾;¾)
is a Nash equilibrium. Since V is countable and ¾(V ) > 0, there exists x 2 V
and y 2 C(x) such that ¾(fxg) > 0. Now consider the mixed strategy ^ ¾
























contradicting the fact that (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium. A symmetric argu-
ment addresses the case ¾0(U) < 1 and completes the proof.
We now extend the arguments in support of Theorem 1 to show that,
assuming payo¤ functions are continuous and X is second countable (i.e.,
the topology on X has a countable base), the supports of Nash equilibria
are included within the uncovered set. This increased generality raises two
technical challenges: …rst, the set V is analytic but, it appears, may be
non-measurable; second, there may no longer be a strategy x 2 V such that
¾(fxg) > 0.
Theorem 2. If X is second countable, u is continuous, and (¾;¾0) is a
Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U) = ¾0(U) = 1. If, in addition, X is a complete,
separable metric space, then there exists a measurable set ^ U µ U such that
¾(^ U) = ¾0(^ U) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that ¾(U) < 1, so there exists a measurable set U0 ¶ U
such that ¾(U0) < 1. Letting V 0 = X n U0, we have V 0 µ V and ¾(V 0) > 0.
Note that, by interchangeability, (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium. Let ^ V be the









and note that, because (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium, ¾(^ V) = ¾(V 0). For
6all x 2 ^ V and all y 2 C(x), u(y;x) > 0 = u(x;x). Thus, continuity of
u yields an open set Zx;y µ X such that x 2 Zx;y and, for all z 2 Zx;y,
u(y;z) > u(x;z).
Now consider ^ V as a topological space endowedwith the relative topology
induced by X. This space is second countable and, therefore, Lindelöf: every
open cover contains a countable subcover. Since fZx;y\^ V j x 2 ^ V ;y 2 C(x)g
is an open cover of V 0, it has a countable subcover fZxk;yk\^ V j k = 1;2;:::g.
Since ¾(
S1
k=1Zxk;yk) ¸ ¾(^ V ) > 0, there exists a k such that ¾(Zxk;yk) >
































where the …rst inequality follows from ykDxk; the second from u(yk;z) >
u(xk;z) for all z 2 Zxk;yk and ¾(Zxk;yk) > 0; and the third from condition
(1). This contradicts the presumption that (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium. A
symmetric argument addresses the case ¾0(U) < 1.
If X is a complete, separable metric space, then, by Lemma 1, V is
analytic. Thus, there are measurable sets Y ¶ V and Z ¶ V such that
¾(Y ) = ¾0(Z) = 0. Setting ^ U = X n (Y \Z), the proof is complete.
By Lemma 1, in the appendix, if X is a compact metric space, U is itself
measurable and we can take ^ U = U in the statement of Theorem 2.
4 Discontinuous Games
Adding compactness of X to the assumptions of Theorem 2, Nash equilibria
exist (see Glicksberg (1952)), and, as a consequence, the uncovered set is
non-empty. The next theorem establishes that G-maximal, and therefore
uncovered, strategies actually exist under very weak continuity assumptions.
This result generalizes McKelvey’s (1986) existence theorem, which assumes
7strict convexity of voter preferences, and it generalizes the result of Bordes,
Le Breton, and Salles (1992) by dropping the metric space structure of X
and weakening continuity.
Theorem 3. If X is compact and fy 2 X j u(x;y) > 0g is open for all
x 2 X, then G-maximal elements exist.
Proof. We …rst de…ne the following (transitive) relations.
xG±y 8z 2 X;u(z;x) > 0 ) u(z;y) > 0
xG¤y xG±y & :yG±x
Every G¤-maximal element is a G-maximal element, so it su¢ces to prove
the existence of the former. To this end, let fx®g be a G¤-chain in X. We
will show that this chain has a G¤-upper bound in X, so that Zorn’s lemma
yields a G¤-maximal element.
If fx®g contains a G¤-upper bound, we are done. Therefore, suppose
otherwise. By compactness, fx®g has an accumulation point, say x. We
…rst show that x is a G±-upper bound of fx®g by taking arbitrary x® and
z 2 X such that u(z;x) > 0. By assumption, there exists an open set Y such
that x 2 Y and, for all y 2 Y, u(z;y) > 0. Because x is an accumulation
point, there exists ®0 > ® such that x®0 2 Y, implying u(z;x®0) > 0. Then
x®0G¤x® implies u(z;x®) > 0, from which we conclude that xG±x®.
We now show that x is a G¤-upper bound, again taking arbitrary x®. If
x®G±x then, by transitivity of G± and the fact that x is a G±-upper bound of
fx®g, it follows that x® is a G±-upper bound. Because fx®g is a G¤-chain,
this means that x® is, in fact, a G¤-upper bound, contrary to our initial
supposition. Thus, the proof is complete.
Our …nal theorem generalizes the second part of Theorem 2 by substan-
tially weakening continuity. The weaker assumption is clearly satis…ed in the
majority voting model when P is open, delivering McKelvey’s (1986) stated
inclusion result as a special case. The possibility of discontinuous payo¤s
adds to the technical challenges of Theorem 2: because we cannot conclude,
under the assumptions of the theorem, that graphC is measurable, we do
not know that V is even analytic. In the proof, we are forced to approximate
graphC from above by an appropriately chosen measurable set.7
7A more subtle point is that, because u is not continuous, we cannot …nd sets Zx;y as in
the proof of Theorem 2, and we cannot directly …nd a pure strategy deviation with positive
expected payo¤. We are forced to use a selection from the measurable approximation of
graphC.
8Theorem 4. If X is a complete, separable metric space, f(x;y) 2 X £X j
u(x;y) > 0g is open, and (¾;¾0) is a Nash equilibrium, then there exists a
measurable set ^ U µ U such that ¾(^ U) = ¾0(^ U) = 1.
Proof. By interchangeability, (¾;¾) and (¾0;¾0) are both Nash equilibria, so
we focus on ¾ without loss of generality. De…ne the following two relations
on X.
xD²y ¾(fw 2 X j u(y;w) > u(x;w)g) < ²
xC²y xD²y & u(x;y) > 0
xC¤y 8² > 0;xC²y
Thus, xD²y if the set of strategies against which y gives a higher payo¤ than
x has measure less than ²; xC²y adds u(x;y) > 0; and xC¤y if u(x;y) > 0
and the set of strategies against which y gives a higher payo¤ than x has
measure zero. Clearly, xCy implies xC¤y, or, alternatively,




De…ne V 0 = projxgraphC¤, and note that V µ V 0.
We claim that graphC², and therefore graphC¤, is measurable. Writing




this will follow if Âfwju(y;w)>u(x;w)g(z) is a measurable function of x, y, and z.
Note that (x;y;z) satis…es Âfwju(y;w)>u(x;w)g(z) = 1 if and only if u(y;z) >
u(x;z), so, because u is measurable, these triples comprise a measurable set,
…nishing the claim. As a consequence, V 0 is analytic.
Suppose there exists a measurable subset ^ V µ V 0 such that ¾(^ V) > 0.
Since (graphC¤) \ (^ V £ X) is measurable, Dellacherie and Meyer’s (1978)
Theorem III.44 (and remarks following) yields a measurable “almost every-
where selection” of (graphC¤) \ (^ V £ X). That is, there is a measurable
function °:X ! X such that, for ¾-almost every x 2 ^ V , (x;°(x)) 2
(graphC¤) \ (^ V £ X). Applying Lusin’s theorem (see Rudin (1966)), there
is a measurable subset ~ V µ ^ V such that ¾(~ V ) > 0 and ° is continuous on
~ V . De…ne ~ °:X ! X by
~ °(x) =
(
°(x) if x 2 ~ V
x else,
9also a measurable function.
Now consider the deviation ~ ¾ = ¾ ± ~ °, meaning ~ ¾(Y ) = ¾(~ °¡1(Y)) for
each measurable Y. For all x 2 ~ V, u(~ °(x);x) > 0, so, using the weak
continuity assumption of the theorem, there exists ±x > 0 such that
8w 2 B±x(x);8y 2 B±x(~ °(x));u(y;w) > 0: (2)
Because ~ ° is continuous on ~ V , ~ °¡1(B±x(~ °(x))) includes a relatively open set
around x. Choose ²x 2 (0;±x) such that
B²x(x) \ ~ V µ ~ °¡1(B±x(~ °(x))): (3)
Since (x;~ °(x)) 2 B²x(x)£B²x(~ °(x)) for all x 2 ~ V, it follows that fB²x(x)£
B²x(~ °(x)) j x 2 ~ V g is an open cover of f(x;~ °(x)) j x 2 ~ Vg. By the Lindelöf
property, it has a countable subcover, fBk(xk) £ Bk(~ °(xk)) j k = 1;2;:::g,
where we write Bk(xk) for B²xk(xk).




Bk(xk) \ ~ V ) = ¾(~ V ) > 0:
In particular, ¾(Bk(xk) \ ~ V ) > 0 for some k. The expected payo¤ from




























The above equality follows from the change of variables theorem, and the
inequality follows from three observations. First, by symmetry and the
assumption that (X;u) is zero-sum,
Z
Bk(xk)£Bk(xk)
u(x0;x00)(¾ £ ¾)(d(x0;x00)) = 0: (4)
10Second, from (3), we have ~ °(w) 2 B±xk(~ °(xk)) for all w 2 Bk(xk); and
from (2), this implies that u(~ °(w);z) > 0 for all w;z 2 Bk(xk); and then
¾(Bk(xk)) > 0 yields
Z
Bk(xk)£Bk(xk)
u(~ °(x0);x00)(¾ £ ¾)(d(x0;x00)) > 0:
Third, for all x 2 ~ V and ¾-almost every w, u(~ °(x);w) ¸ u(x;w). Thus, we
have contradicted the presumption that (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, there is no measurable subset of V 0 with positive measure.
Because V 0 is analytic, there there are measurable sets Y µ V 0 and Z ¶ V 0
such that ¾(Y ) = ¾0(Z). We have just shown that ¾(Y ) = 0. Setting
^ U = X n Z and noting that V µ V 0, the proof is complete.
Our last example demonstrates that Theorem 4 cannot be stated without
some continuity condition on u.
Example 5. Let X = [0;1] with payo¤s below, where the solid diagonal
line contains entries equal to 1; the dashed diagonal line contains entries
equal to ¡1; and all other entries are 0. Here, every strategy x 2 [0;1=2)
is covered by x+1=2, but the strategies de…ned by the uniform probability
distribution on [0;1=2) constitute a Nash equilibrium.
[Figure 5 here.]
5 Extensions
Though de…ned in the context of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games,
the covering relation is easily extended to general symmetric games. Let
(X;u1;u2) denote a (possibly non-zero-sum) game, symmetric in the sense
that u1(x;y) = u2(y;x) for all x;y 2 X. We modify the de…nition of covering
as follows.
xCy u1(x;y) > u1(y;y)& xDy
As with the zero-sum case, the uncovered set is a superset of the undomi-
nated strategies. In the Bertrand model of competition between two price-
setting …rms, for example, the unique Nash equilibrium is for both …rms to
announce price equal to marginal cost — a strategy weakly dominated for
both …rms yet uncovered, suggesting that the inclusion results of Section 4
may be more general than stated there.
We now generalize the proof of Theorem 2 in a sequence of steps (for
simplicity, considering only the …rst part of the theorem), relying on the
original proof for our arguments:
11Assume X is second countable, (X;u1;u2) is symmetric with
continuous payo¤s and interchangeable equilibria. If (¾;¾0) is a
Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U) = ¾0(U) = 1.
We can easily drop the assumption of interchangeability by restating the
result for symmetric equilibria:
Assume X is second countable and (X;u1;u2) is symmetric with
continuous payo¤s. If (¾;¾) is a Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U) =
1.
Furthermore, we can relax the symmetry requirement, de…ning covering as
above but with the interpretation of “covering for player 1.” Letting U1
denote the set of strategies uncovered for player 1, the following extension
is straightforward:
If X is second countable, u1 is continuous, and (¾;¾) is a Nash
equilibrium, then ¾(U1) = 1.
De…ne a strategy pair (¾;¾0) to be mutually absolutely continuous if, for all
measurable Y µ X, ¾(Y ) = 0 if and only if ¾0(Y ) = 0. This lets us generalize
the result to equilibria that are, in at least a limited sense, non-symmetric:
If X is second countable, u1 is continuous, and (¾;¾0) is a mu-
tually absolutely continuous Nash equilibrium, then ¾(U1) = 1.
Finally, for an n-player game (X;u1;:::;un), de…ne x to cover y for player
i if ui(x;y;:::;y) > ui(y;:::;y) and xDy. The reader can check that the
proof of Theorem 2 is easily modi…ed to support our last generalization of
the theorem:
If X is second countable, u1 is continuous, and (¾1;:::;¾n) is a
mutually absolutely continuous Nash equilibrium, then ¾1(U1) =
1.
Unfortunately, Theorem 4 is not so easily generalized, because equality
(4) relies on the symmetric, zero-sum structure of the game. The example
of the Bertrand model suggests that it does generalize, but we leave this
question open.
A Appendix
Let (W;-) be a measurable space. A set Y µ W is analytic if there exists
a compact metric space, E, with its Borel ¾-algebra, and a measurable
12set B µ W £ E, endowed with the product ¾-algebra, such that Y is the
projection of B. Every measurable subset of W is analytic, but there are
some analytic sets that are not measurable. A set Y is coanalytic if it is
the complement of an analytic set. Analyticity is preserved by countable
intersections and unions, but not complementation. Thus, coanalytic sets
may not be analytic.
The analytic sets are close to measurable, however. If Y is analytic then,
for any probability measure ¹ on (W;-), there are measurable sets S and
R such that S µ Y µ R and ¹(S) = ¹(R).
A function f:X ! < is analytic if, for all c, fx 2 X j f(x) > rg is
analytic; equivalently, if, for all c, fx 2 X j f(x) ¸ rg is analytic.
Animportant virtue of analytic sets is the following. Let S be a complete,
separable metric space (and, therefore, a Souslin space), and let A be an
analytic subset of S £W. Then the projection of A onto W is analytic. In
contrast, we can say nothing about the projection of coanalytic sets.
See Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) for a complete treatment of analytic
sets and functions, or see Stinchcombe and White (1992) for a good survey.
Lemma 1.
1. If X is a complete, separable metric space, then graphC is coanalytic.
2. If u is continuous, then graphC is measurable. If, in addition, X is a
complete, separable metric space, then V is analytic.
3. If X is a compact metric space and u is continuous, then V (and
therefore U) is measurable.
Proof. 1. De…ne f:X£X£X ! < by f(x;y;z) = u(x;z)¡u(y;z). Because
u is measurable, f is measurable with respect to the product ¾-algebra on
X £ X £ X. De…ne f¤:X £ X ! < by f¤(x;y) = supz2X f(x;y;z). By
Stinchcombe and White’s (1992) Theorem 2.17, f¤ is analytic, and it follows
that f(x;y) 2 X £X j f¤(x;y) > 0g is an analytic set. Noting that graphC
is the complement of
f(x;y) 2 X £ X j u(x;y) ¸ 0g[ f(x;y) 2 X £X j f¤(x;y) > 0g;
an analytic set, we see that graphC is coanalytic.
2. If u is continuous, then f is also. Note that f(x;y) 2 X £ X j
f¤(x;y) > 0g is the projection of the open set
f(x;y;z) 2 X £X £ X j f(x;y;z) > 0g;
13and is therefore itself open. Then graphC is the complement of a measurable
set, as above, and, therefore, measurable. The set V is the projection of
graphC, and, if X is a complete, separable metric space, V is therefore
analytic.
3. Now add the assumption that X is compact. By the theorem of the
maximum, f¤ is continuous, implying that f(x;y) 2 X£X j f¤(x;y) ¸ 0g is
closed. Then, from the above analysis, each section C(x) is the intersection
of an open set and a closed set, andthus C(x) can be writtenas the countable
union of compact subsets of X. Using Stinchcombe and White’s (1992) Fact
2.2, as in the proof of their Example 2.12, it follows that V = projxgraphC
is measurable. (See also Larman (1973), Corollary to Theorem 1.) Then, of
course, U = X n V is measurable as well.
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16x y z w
x 0 1 1 1
y -1 0 -1 1
z -1 1 0 -1
w -1 -1 1 0
Figure 1: xCz but z is rationalizable.
x y z
x 0 -2 -2
y 1 0 -3
z 1 -3 0
Figure 2: x is C-maximal but not rationalizable.
17x y z
x 0 1 -1
y -1 0 0
z 1 0 0
Figure 3: y is played in equilibrium but xMy.
x y z w
x 0 1 0 -1
y -1 0 1 -1
z 0 -1 0 1
w 1 1 -1 0
Figure 4: y is played in equilibrium but xGy.
18Figure 5: Nash equilibrium using covered strategies.
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